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I am delighted to write the introduction to Volume 5 of the Yearbook on 
Arbitration and Mediation.  I begin by expressing my deep gratitude to all of the students 
who are members of the Yearbook’s Editorial Board and staff, with special thanks to 
Editor-in-Chief Zach Morahan for all of his efforts.  The Yearbook has made great strides 
in every year of its existence.  This year is no exception.  Indeed, its progress is especially 
notable on several fronts. 
And now it is my pleasure to turn to the Yearbook’s 2013 symposium: The Role of 
the Courts: Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards and Mediated Settlement Agreements.  It 
is an honor to introduce the articles written for this symposium, which was designed to 
capture, and contribute to, three different dialogues: 1) the dialogue that is taking place 
between our public courts and private arbitration, regarding the place of arbitration; 2) the 
similar dialogue that is occurring between our public courts and mediation; and 3) the 
dialogue that sometimes occurs between those who identify more with arbitration and 
those who tend to favor mediation.    
The first dialogue—which has had its ups and downs—is most obvious.  As 
anyone interested in arbitration in the U.S. must know by now, our courts initially were 
hostile to arbitration.  The merchants who had inserted these clauses in their contracts, 
though, asserted their right to self-determination.  They had selected this dispute 
resolution procedure in order to vest procedural and decision-making power in arbitrators 
who would understand and enforce the merchants’ procedural and substantive norms.  
Congress responded with the Federal Arbitration Act, compelling courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements as they would any other contracts.   
From the perspective of someone like myself, who has focused primarily on 
mediation, a period of relative calm ensued.  Arbitration appeared to operate quite self-
sufficiently within its own self-contained sphere of influence in the commercial sector.
1
  
But even for me, it was clear that the situation changed dramatically in 1991.  That year, 
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
2
 the Supreme Court opened the door to the 
use of arbitration to decide all sorts of statutory, civil rights claims arising out of 
contracts of adhesion.  While merchants and commercial arbitrators had hailed arbitration 
as an expression of self-determination, the Supreme Court had apparently spied a tool for 
the provision of streamlined, inexpensive, individualized adjudication that could relieve 
courts’ burgeoning dockets.   
The enforcement of arbitration clauses has been the focus of an extraordinary 
number of recent Supreme Court decisions.  The ultimate power of arbitration, however, 
lies in its ability to produce outcomes that actually will be implemented.  When 
arbitration was truly private, and was the result of arms-length negotiation among 
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merchants, arbitration proponents could count on the process being perceived as fair and 
worthy of voluntary compliance.  That is much less true today.  When arbitration is the 
“creature” of a contract of adhesion, and when courts have forced arbitration on unwilling 
parties, the stage is set for skepticism about arbitration’s fairness and compliance with 
arbitral awards cannot be assumed.  Winning parties are more likely to turn to the courts 
for help once again, this time with the enforcement of the award produced by court-
ordered arbitration.  Should courts always enforce these awards?  Does every arbitral 
award deserve enforcement?   
At this point in the evolution of mandatory predispute arbitration, judicial review 
is the slender reed that remains to ensure that the procedure is sufficiently accountable to 
merit access to the enforcement power of the state.  Consistent with this new reality, 
Professor Jeffrey Stempel urges that the Supreme Court’s expansive enforcement of 
arbitration agreements must be matched by an equally-expansive jurisprudence regarding 
the grounds for judicial review.  He urges, in particular, that if arbitral awards reflect 
clear errors of factual determination or application of law, they should be interpreted as 
imperfect executions of arbitrators’ power and should be vacated for failing to meet the 
requirement of “a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted.”3  
In a similar vein, Professor Maureen Weston highlights the far-reaching (but largely 
under-appreciated) decision of Preston v. Ferrer,
4
 in which the Supreme Court 
announced that “[w]hen parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, 
the FAA supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether 
judicial or administrative.”5  Professor Weston fears Preston’s preemptive effect.  
Specifically, she anticipates that arbitration will be used to undermine state agencies’ 
ability to protect citizens and implement public policy, subject to state-defined grounds 
for judicial review.  She calls for Congress to rein in the “monster” that the FAA has 
become, and ensure that private arbitration is required to operate within the bounds of 
state and federal law, not as a means around those laws.
6
  Sounding substantially more 
optimistic, Professor Allen Blair suggests that even though the Supreme Court made clear 
in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.
7
 that contracting parties may not dictate 
additional grounds for judicial review to federal courts, state courts may want to seize the 
opportunity to innovate and respond to parties’ preferences in this area.8   
The second dialogue, between public courts and mediation, obviously is different 
in some ways.  It is much less likely that courts will be asked to enforce a mediation 
clause contained in a contract, although that is changing as companies adopt “tiered” 
dispute resolution clauses.  Rather, much mediation occurs within the courts as part of 
court-connected mediation programs.  Courts often order or strongly encourage parties to 
use mediation.  They can do this because mediation is a consensual process, and courts 
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are not depriving parties of their day in court.  They are merely conditioning access upon 
an attempt to reach settlement through mediation.   
As soon as we scratch the surface, though, we find dynamics in this dialogue that 
are much like those that exist in the dialogue between the courts and arbitration.  
Mediation, like arbitration, is grounded in self-determination.  Proponents laud its ability 
to: enhance the content and civility of parties’ communication and negotiation; permit the 
parties’ uncovering of the underlying interests and norms that are important to them; and 
produce customized, creative solutions.  As Professor Jennifer Reynolds observes, some 
judges value these aspects of mediation, especially if the judges serve as mediators 
themselves or care about the “fit” between the social role of our courts and mediation.9  
But according to Professor Reynolds, when judges focus on their obligation to process 
cases, they are much more likely to see mediation’s potential to clear court dockets, 
reduce expenses for the parties and courts, and whittle away at case disposition times.  In 
other words, when the institutional needs of the courts dominate, the efficiency of 
settlement becomes much more salient than parties’ self-determination.   
Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley expresses concerns about court-connected 
mediation’s focus on settlement.  In particular, she points to evidence that parties 
increasingly are objecting to the enforcement of mediated settlement agreements, arguing 
that there was never a meeting of the minds or that the agreements were the product of 
manipulation or even outright coercion.  Professor Nolan-Haley, therefore, proposes an 
end to court-ordered mediation.  She suggests using incentives instead.  Specifically, U.S. 
courts could borrow a page from the U.K. and authorize judges to approve fee-shifting if 
a party’s refusal to mediate was not reasonable.10  Last, Professor James Coben examines 
the role of mediators in helping class counsel and class representatives settle class 
actions.  Importantly, Professor Coben reveals the very substantial deference that judges 
grant to these mediators as the judges determine whether or not to approve class 
settlements.  Professor Coben expresses great skepticism about the wisdom of judges’ 
reliance on mediators’ presence as a sort of heuristic for procedural and substantive 
fairness.  He therefore proposes that mediators should be replaced with special masters 
who should be required to file reports explaining why settlements are non-collusive and 
sufficiently fair to absent class members.
11
  
The final dialogue, between mediation sympathizers and arbitration proponents, 
might not be obvious to anyone outside the dispute resolution family.
12
  As should 
already be clear, arbitration and mediation share a common grounding in self-
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determination.  But they are also quite different.  In this, they resemble siblings in many 
families.  Mediation looks like a meeting (or series of ex parte meetings); it is described 
as “consensual;” and it produces settlement agreements, a type of contract.  Arbitration is 
the “the creature of contract,” but it generally looks like a hearing (that includes all of the 
parties); it is described as “adjudicative;” and it produces an award.   
What happens when mediation and arbitration, like some siblings, are forced to 
work together?  It’s complicated.  Imagine that the parties use one neutral, who serves 
first as a mediator.  In that role, he meets privately with each side and learns confidential 
information.  The matter fails to settle.  The mediator then becomes an arbitrator.  He 
now knows “secret information” which may or may not be disclosed during the 
arbitration proceeding.  This “secret information” may find its way into his award.  
Professor Ellen Deason grapples with these issues and focuses particularly on the 
appropriate standard of judicial review for the award produced by med-arb.  Very 
interestingly, she begins by concluding that the FAA would not apply, because the med-
arb process differs so materially from arbitration.  She then emphasizes the need for 
courts to engage in rigorous examination of a party’s consent to waive the fundamental 
due process rights of equal treatment and an opportunity to be heard.  Finally, Professor 
Deason explains what courts should demand before they deem such consent to be 
sufficiently knowing and voluntary.
13
  Professor Andrea Schneider tackles a different 
relationship between consensual and adjudicative processes, in the investment treaty 
arbitration context.  She examines what sort of consensual process is needed to address 
the role of, and norms guiding, the annulment committees that review arbitral panels’ 
awards.  On this increasingly important and contentious topic, she urges the inclusion of 
all stakeholders in a transparent and procedurally just process to clarify what “error 
correction” should mean and how it can best be accomplished (which may include 
considering the merits of an appeal process compared to annulment, as well a quasi-
political process compared to a quasi-judicial process).
14
 
All of these articles reflect the authors’ great respect (and even affection) for 
arbitration, mediation and the new hybrids that are developing.  All of them also reflect 
these authors’ recognition of the need for hard-headed examination and skepticism 
regarding the claims made by any process, as well as need to consider context.  
Inevitably, all of these articles affirm the key role played by courts in their exercise of 
judicial review.  Today, judicial review represents the most important procedural 
counterweight to assure arbitration’s accountability. 
There is great dynamism in the world (or worlds) of arbitration and mediation 
today.  So many relationships, so much reason for dialogue.  We hope that you enjoy 
(and use) this volume of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation. 
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